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ABSTRACT
In Linguistic Bodies, Ezequiel A. Di Paolo, Elena Clare Cuffari and Hanne De Jaegher (2018) 
propose a dialectic method to explain organism’s movements and exchanges, i.e., life inter-
actions and evolution, that can also explain the evolution from life to cultural relations, that 
include linguistic interactions. One of the main questions Linguistic Bodies wants to answer 
is how to explain human life and culture without a reductive scientific thought. If one defies 
radical reductionism, one of the central risks is to dissociate physical inquiries from biologi-
cal investigations. In the book, the authors oppose the analytical mode of thinking present 
in many natural sciences to a dialectical mode of thinking that would explain living beings’ 
interactions. It is relevant to question if they succeeded in defending the dialectical model 
they profess to be the best suited to explain human social phenomena. Following this line 
of rationale, in this paper, I will, first, show that dialectical methods are over-ambitious and, 
second, inquire into the anti-reductionist attitude present in the dialectical model advocat-
ed in Linguistic Bodies.
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RESUMO
Em Linguistic Bodies, Ezequiel A. Di Paolo, Elena Clare Cuffari e Hanne De Jaegher (2018) 
propõem um método dialético para explicar os movimentos de organismos e as trocas que 
ocorrem entre eles, isto é, as interações orgânicas e sua evolução, que podem também ex-
plicar a evolução da vida até as relações culturais — que, por sua vez, incluem interações 
linguísticas. Uma das principais questões que Linguistic Bodies quer responder é como expli-
car a vida e a cultura humanas sem um pensamento científico redutivista. Se desafiamos, no 
entanto, o redutivismo radical, um dos principais riscos no qual incorremos é o de dissociar 
investigações físicalistas de investigações biológicas. No livro, os autores opõem o modo 
analítico de pensamento presente em muitas ciências naturais ao modo dialético de pensar, 
que explicaria interações entre seres vivos. É relevante questionar se eles tiveram sucesso em 
defender o modelo dialético que professam ser o mais adequado para explicar os fenômenos 
sociais humanos. Seguindo essa linha de raciocínio, neste artigo, mostrarei, primeiramente, 
que métodos dialéticos são excessivamente ambiciosos e, em segundo lugar, investigarei a 
atitude anti-reducionista presente no modelo dialético sustentado em Linguistic Bodies.
Palavras-chave: Corpos linguísticos, Reducionismo radical, Modelo dialético.
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1. Starting Point
In Linguistic Bodies, Ezequiel A. Di Paolo, Elena Clare 
Cuffari and Hanne De Jaegher (2018) propose a dialectic 
method to explain organism’s movements and exchanges, 
i.e., life interact ions and evolution, that can also explain the 
evolution from life to cultural relations, that include linguis-
tic interact ions. They are inspired by Maturana’s and Vare-
la’s (1992) vision of how life evolved in organisms that have 
autonomy, that organize themselves internally (autopoiesis), 
and that adapt —structurally couple— to their environment 
through this same autopoiesis. Varela’s, Thomson’s and Rosch’s 
embodied cognition theory (1992) delimits the boundaries of 
Di Paolo’s, Cuffari’s and Jaegher’s linguistic bodies explanation 
system. Using dozens of other authors, like Bakhtin, Hegel, 
Lakoff, Marx, Merleau-Ponty, Piaget and Vygotsky, they cre-
ate a dialectical model that should be able to explain, among 
other events, autonomy, adaptability, sensorimotor agency, 
social interact ion, participatory sense-making and linguistic 
bodies interact ions.
In the book, the authors oppose the analytical mode of 
thinking to dialectical thinking. One of the likelihoods with 
choosing a method and staying with it is not recognizing 
the object’s autonomy to be something other than what the 
method observes in it. We continuously claim to explain the 
totality of the world, and we find it difficult to accept a partial 
and incomplete view of what is outside us. In this desire to ex-
plain the totality, we may end up imposing our reasoning and 
its forms on the phenomena that often present themselves 
disconnected to our senses. Following this line of rationale, 
in this paper, I will, first, show that dialectical methods are 
over-ambitious and, second, inquire into the anti-reduction-
ist attitude present in the dialectical model advocated in Lin-
guistic Bodies.
2. Dialectical Methods
Regarding Kant, Hegel sometimes sp eaks with great ad-
miration and resp ect and sometimes as his greatest opponent. 
Hegel considers the Kantian system as a major milest one in 
the history of philosophy, but he also considers that it has 
serious flaws, such as the consolidation of the subject-object 
dualism. Hegel’s criticism of Kant focuses mainly on his asser-
tion of the existence of an external world that is epistemically 
independent of the subject and, above all, not accessible to 
human knowledge, which would be the thing-in-itself. It is 
of paramount importance for Hegel to overcome Kantism as 
understood as containing an unresolved dualism.
According to Kant (1957b), teleological judgment of 
nature is compatible with nature’s mechanical explanation. 
Without the a priori principles of understanding, it would 
not be possible for us to have any knowledge of our intuitions. 
However, the natural phenomena that result from the deter-
mination of judgments about nature may appear in our judg-
ment as mere aggregates and be explained only mechanically. 
The categories of understanding are often insufficient in the 
logical account of natural phenomena and in their investiga-
tion. Therefore, it is essential for judging about nature to have 
the subjective persp ective of the reflexive judgment. Through 
it, nature is evaluated as a technique whose forms have a pur-
pose. However, whether in the teleological judgment or in the 
determinate judgment, it is not a question of nature and its 
forms as they are “in themselves”, but only in the way we know 
or think them. 
Enact ivism would not be compatible with Kantian tran-
scendental idealism because the Kantian methodology is not 
ambitious enough: it est ablishes limits to our understanding 
of nature —but not, obviously in a Cartesian spirit, of the hu-
man mind. According to Kant, our knowledge of nature is 
always limited to our cognitive capacities and is determined 
by them. In some sense, nature is what we “suppose” it is. 
Hegelian approach and method intend to overpass Kantian 
epistemological restrictions, presupposing unlimited human 
capacity to know about natural and cultural developments. In 
Linguistic Bodies’ enact ive approach, we recognize these Hege-
lian assumptions:
We can understand the enactive approach 
as resolving the classic contradiction be-
tween subjectivity and world that other 
approaches in philosophy of mind do not 
resolve (enhancing, instead, one term of the 
relation at the expense of the other). Sub-
ject and world do not meet as two ready-
made poles of being that must be put into 
some harmonious relation, in an operation 
that leaves the terms (and the relation) 
external to each other. There is a passage 
from world to subject and from subject to 
world. Enactivists “resolve” this passage 
by thematizing the third element between 
the static poles: bodies in action and their 
world-transforming practices. Thus the 
whole system is set in motion and ontolog-
ical questions are neither reduced to epis-
temology nor severed from it. As we have 
seen in the first part, significance is enacted 
by bodies in the world, which are also bod-
ies of the world. But this is nothing if not the 
dialectical transformation of a solid dichoto-
my into a fluid, dynamic, ongoing becoming 
of bodies in action. This is at the core of the 
original formulation of enactive ideas when 
it is said that enaction brings forth a world 
(Varela et al. 1991). (…) In this sense, dia-
lectics is, and has been since the start, one 
way of thinking enactively (Di Paolo et al., 
2018, p. 186).
According to Hegel (1948), the dialectical method is 
the only method that allows knowledge of the pure forms of 
thought, so that this thought is objective, with all its natural or 
spiritual content. It is the dialectical method that enables He-
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gel to think subject and object together, preserving the essential 
difference between the two. Just as sensitive certainty observes 
the coexistence of opposites in the world: health-disease, sad-
ness-joy, ... so it is also through the relationship between op-
posites that the absolute develops in Hegel. The internal con-
tradiction to the absolute system means its very survival and 
even its existence. It is through contradiction that thought has 
evolved and, with it, reality: thinking is objective.
The evolution of consciousness (Hegel, 1952) is a his-
torical evolution if we think it as universal or as a universal 
spiritual consciousness that, through several stages, over-
comes itself and understands itself as that same evolution, 
understands itself as the whole process. Absolute knowledge, 
therefore, is not external to sensitive certainty but contains 
the various moments that it had to go through and that it 
always goes through again to be charact erized as a maximum, 
absolute knowledge. Absolute knowledge is the global move-
ment of consciousness and, at the same time, self-awareness, 
which is known to be that same movement and carries within 
itself all the determinations that were subsumed (aufgehebt).
Contradiction (Hegel, 1948), which appeared, at the 
beginning of the Wissenschaft der Logik, as part of being, re-
appears in further parts of this book as a product of reflection 
and is subsumed by reason. Reason reflects on itself, rising 
above the indifference of opposites and determining itself as 
a result of that indifference. Reason overcomes indifference 
and, at the same time, retains contradiction as its truth. The 
self-reflection that reason operates is not the resolution of the 
contradiction that resulted from the interact ion between op-
posites, because contradiction proves to be the true essence 
of sp eculative thinking and, therefore, to be insurmountable. 
Contradiction as part of a dialectical method is comprised in 
the dialectical model of Linguistic Bodies:
We will also discuss how a realm of ideality 
emerges from embodied and linguistic prac-
tices, one with its own grounded normativ-
ity. In all these developments, the tensions 
that start with our initial dialectical situation 
undergo changes and become differentially 
expressed, but they never entirely disap-
pear. As a consequence, linguistic bodies 
remain unfinished, always becoming, even 
in adulthood, and navigating a sea of mean-
ing-engendering and person-constituting 
utterances and relations, not all produced 
by them. Linguistic bodies are self-con-
tradictory, social products and personal 
achievements, sustaining displaced rela-
tions to themselves, committing to choices 
and abiding in potentiality, coupling flows 
of self- and other-directed utterances (Di 
Paolo et al., 2018, p. 28).
Pure essence, the content of logic (Hegel, 1948), when 
exposed conceptually, moves dialectically. The movement 
of the essence is the same as that of thought. The essence of 
thought is the essence of objects: thought and object devel-
op their truth dialectically. Their truth is the same: thought 
and object have the same essence. That is why Hegel calls the 
thought of the essence objective thought, and that is also why, 
starting from the being, from immediacy, one arrives at the 
concept that was already presupposed in the being and which, 
in turn, presupposes the being. Being is a moment of the con-
cept, but the being contains the concept in itself. Linguistic 
Bodies’ dialectical model follows Hegelian logic:
Our approach to continuity is not about 
reducing language to a way of interacting; 
neither is it a deflationary strategy. We in-
troduce a dialectical method that will pre-
cisely show that it is possible to construct 
new categories out of previous ones with-
out deflating or reducing language. Start-
ing from the general and relatively abstract 
situation of embodied agents acting and 
making sense together during social inter-
actions, we will see how each move toward 
a concept of linguistic agency in turn affects 
and even redefines the previous moves (…) 
(Di Paolo et al., 2018, p. 27).
Even so, the dialectic model described and est ablished 
by the authors in Linguistic Bodies is not strictly sp eaking a 
Hegelian model, because it is a materialistic one, closer to 
Marxist theories of history, society, human nature, educa-
tion, developmental psychology, linguistic and culture. Nev-
ertheless, the way the model is presented in Linguistic Bodies
resembles more Hegelian dialectics than Marxist dialectics 
since it is mainly presented formally, with few examples, as if 
the model would come before the facts it explains. 
Marx retained Hegelian formalism and idealism when 
writing about the future of humanity, projecting a dialectic 
movement of history, society and politics that did not have to 
do anymore with economic dialectic evolution. Instead of just 
predicting a natural outcome of economic evolution, Marx 
was concerned with est ablishing a historical outcome norma-
tively. That was Marx’s weakness as a social researcher. 
I would not advocate just letting history happen. Doing 
that would be ignoring the role of intentionality, purpose and 
politics in human society. As alleged by many Marxist’s crit-
ics, one thing is to explain what happens or to suppose dif-
ferent possible historical outcomes, another entirely different 
thing is to say that one knows as a fact what will and what 
should happen in the future, without being open to changes in 
our precognition. One of the Marxist’s Hegelian inheritance 
(Marx, 1976) is determinism: not only dialectics is the way 
human society, economy and politics evolve, but it can deter-
mine the social, economic and political outcome. More than 
that: if humans get conscious of how human history evolves, 
they can alter —according to their will, based on ethical 
norms—, intentionally, consistently and necessarily the out-
come. I would not say that Linguistic Bodies advocate this kind 
of determinism. However, it reappears every time dialectic 
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methods seek to fill the dualistic gap between the epistemic 
subject and its objects because it seems that mastering the ra-
tional method that corresponds ontologically to how reality 
evolves gives us power over the results.
3. Physical Laws, Biological 
Norms, Social Norms
In many relevant senses, nature does not evolve as hu-
man history, i.e., some numerous additional laws and norms 
rule human societies, that are not needed to elucidate natural 
evolution apart from cultural evolution. However, saying that 
should not imply that cultural development is not caused also 
by natural laws and norms. What it should imply is that when 
nature evolves and results in human’s complex societies, there 
is the need to use additional cause-effect or dialectic models (or 
sub-models) to succeed in explaining human’s cultural events.
Linguistic Bodies’ authors criticize the ordinary causal 
way of scientific thought that est ablishes causal relations be-
tween facts. Why? Because the causal model of explaining re-
ality is not capable to explain dialectic relations of organisms 
(life) that enable evolution:
The enactive approach rejects constitutive 
dualism but is not satisfied with a claim that 
nothing differentiates the mental from the 
biological, or the biological from the physi-
cal. One alternative to make sense of these 
apparently contradictory sources of enac-
tivist dissatisfaction is to do so dialectically, 
through an understanding of how concepts 
like autonomy permit both continuity and 
sharp changes and transformations that 
do not conceptually “unhook” new “lev-
els” from older ones, but on the contrary, 
reshape all “levels” in accordance with the 
most recent innovations. Nothing is quite 
left behind in the enactive story (Di Paolo et 
al., 2018, p. 185).
  The dialectical materialist model —inspired by the 
Hegelian idealistic and historical dialectical scheme— seems 
to be well-suited to explain life and life-evolution and also 
seems to surpass the causal and dualistic (cause-effect) mod-
el of thought. Nevertheless, one main question that emerg-
es from this method replacement would be if choosing the 
dialectical model would implicate to question other ways of 
phenomena explanations, such as the causal or the mathe-
matical explanations that reduce physical and biological phe-
nomena to equations and laws. The authors claim that: “The 
continuity between life and mind is a guiding statement for 
a nonreductive naturalism that takes our experience as con-
crete human beings seriously, without dualisms” (Di Paolo et 
al., 2018, p. 23).
As Di Paolo shows in previews writings (2003), even if 
we try to replicate life forms or models of life evolution, there 
always remains a limit between organismic metabolism, au-
tonomy and homeostasis and what is possible to plan and 
programing for non-living beings aimed at them to resemble 
living beings:
(…) we can already put some emphasis on 
the main issues: 1) an animal is a natural 
agent who generates its own boundaries 
and defines its world, a robot is an agent in 
virtue of external conventions of spatiotem-
poral and material continuity; 2) as a corol-
lary, an animal does not simply have purpos-
es, but generates them, a robot, alas, only 
has them, and it has them in a restricted 
sense solely in virtue of an externally im-
posed connection between its organization 
and its environment. The relation of recipro-
cal causality that obtains in the animal, that 
between what it is and what it does and 
endures, appears in a broken version in the 
robot (Di Paolo, 2003, p. 4).
Therefore, even if according to materialism the essential 
components of life and other non-living things are the same, 
i.e., subsumed by the same laws of physics and chemistry, the 
way former reacts to their environment —to disturbances of 
the environment that alter their inner autopoiesis— is funda-
mentally different from the way the latter would internally 
react to the same disturbances. Notwithstanding Di Paolo 
proposal of improving robotics (2003) by imitating living 
beings autopoietic inner dynamics, not just its outer move-
ments, trying to simulate —not strictly replicate— “homeo-
static adaptation and teleology”, the gap between living beings 
and non-living beings that simulate the first is not, according 
to him, surmountable. Thus does this mean that there is, in 
principle, a unexplainable gap between nature and life? Or: Is 
life radically different from non-living matter? Or is life just 
different in degree from non-living matter? In other words: Is 
the way life evolves —dialectically— radically different from 
the way matter reacts? Or should we attempt to reduce life to 
matter in our scientific explanations?
One of the main problems to sustain a radical difference 
between our way of explaining matter and life is to separate 
matter evolution from life evolution or to separate laws of the 
matter from norms or models of life. We have some possibil-
ities when dealing with the matter-life dichotomy: 1. We can 
sustain that there is no gap between matter and life, but that 
we are cognitive limited living beings that have no guarantee of 
eliminating this explanatory gap; 2. We can affirm the essen-
tial difference between matter and life and also maintain that 
there are different methods to approach and investigate both 
subjects; 3. We can claim that the human method of investi-
gating matter and life is the same, but that these are different 
subjects. I believe that the first option is closer to Kant’s point 
of view because it affirms the rational and empirical limits of 
human cognitive capacities. The dialectical model proposed 
by Di Paolo, Cuffari and Jaegher seems to oscillate between 
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options 2 and 3 because they state a fundamental difference 
between non-living matter and life —esp ecially human life— 
but it is not clear if they would want to expand the dialectical 
model they propose to other natural sciences. The Hegelian 
view, according to Cirne Lima’s work (2012) —inspired by 
von Bertalanffy (1968)—, could accommodate nature inside 
the background of dialectic-metaphysical logic and as part of 
the history of the human spirit dialectical phenomenology.
One of the main questions Linguistic Bodies wants to an-
swer is how to explain human life and culture without a re-
ductive scientific thought. Therefore, it is relevant to question 
if they succeeded in this purpose. Reductionism is based on 
the belief that it is possible to reduce one scientific discourse 
into another, i.e., to translate one into the other, achieving at 
the endpoint one discourse, which is, then, seen as more fun-
damental. One can, for example, explain DNA by describing 
its chromosomes, and one can describe its chromosomes by 
describing its genes. However, one can also describe the genes 
by describing molecules and atoms through graphic and phys-
ical models that explain how, for example, a hydrogen atom 
works, which is its internal structure, how it behaves concern-
ing other atoms, which physical and chemical laws —quan-
tum laws and equations— can be applied to it. The main an-
ti-reductionist claim that prevents scientists from adhering to 
the reductionist approach is the finding that when one arrives 
at the quantum level, the biological level of the genes and how 
they behave and work vanishes.
The dialectic model of Linguistic Bodies craves to show 
how human social life and meaningful linguistic bodies be-
have.2 Moreover, it is close to embodied cognition theories 
that saw robotic as a way to demonstrate the disp ensability of 
representations in general autonomous behavior. One could 
ask if this proximity does not challenge the methodological 
ambition of having a universal dialectic method to explain life 
and culture. If robotics —even if subsidiary to embodied cog-
nition theories and even if it is possible to approach more and 
more robot behaviour to human behaviour3— has its laws, 
equations and methods, what does this prove? Does it prove 
1. That there are different levels of explanations that are not 
reducible one to another? Or 2. That we can hope to reduce 
in the future explanations of living behaviour to explanations 
of non-living behaviour or vice-versa, mainly because the base 
of both is the same: matter? 
According to the theories of embodied cognition, we re-
act to asp ects of the environment without consciously repre-
senting those asp ects, and without computing in a strict sense. 
That can be simulated with simple robots’ commands: when 
spotting an obstacle at a certain angle, deflecting either left 
or right. Some experiments (Del Dottore et al., 2018) show 
that robots collectively decide where to start self-assembly, 
depending on environmental conditions. At some self-assem-
bling stage, robots create, for example, tree-like structures 
that grow toward the light. The results demonstrate how an 
adaptive growth process can be implemented in robots.
If one defies radical reductionism, one of the central risks 
is to dissociate physical investigations from biological investiga-
tions. The authors of Linguistic Bodies sustain that it is possible 
to surpass the gaps between levels of scientific explanations re-
placing our causal explanations by dialectic descriptions:
A dialectical understanding of these rela-
tions therefore implies that as we move 
from active matter to life “and to the realm 
of agency and sense-making”, we simulta-
neously move into a sharper understanding 
of materiality, and also into an understand-
ing of how active matter becomes trans-
formed by mental phenomena. Accommo-
dations occur at all scales. Not only do we 
have minds that are material and biological, 
but with minds, biology and materiality be-
come minded, or partake of the complexi-
ties of the mind. This way of looking at life-
mind continuity dialectically, as contrasting 
terms interpenetrate each other, differs 
from hierarchical approaches that focus on 
levels of causality. These approaches tend 
to restrict the links between the proposed 
“levels” (say, between biological and psy-
chological phenomena) to a series of causal 
relations. For instance, information process-
ing is implemented in the brain, so the brain 
is causally implicated in how information is 
processed, and cognition inherits several of 
these causal constraints, but is otherwise 
constitutively independent of them. With 
such moves, naturalism is acknowledged in 
the causal domain, while dualism persists 
in the constitutive domain (Di Paolo et al., 
2018, p. 185).
Professing the continuity of nature and life —even con-
scious life— can mean many things: 1. It can mean that we 
believe in the ontological continuity of both; 2. It can mean 
that we believe that the same method of investigation can be 
used when researching both; 3. It can mean that we expect 
to achieve a global and all-embracing theory —with its laws 
and equations— that includes among its objects animate 
and inanimate ones. These three choices are not necessari-
2 Antireductionism consistently appears in Linguistic Bodies assertions: “(…) we steer clear of such reductive interpretations of 
sense-making by insisting that its enactment is a condition that applies to concrete whole engagements between organisms and envi-
ronment, not to any particular part of this whole” (Di Paolo et al., 2018, p. 63). Or: “Unlike other approaches, the enactive perspective 
takes the life-mind continuity seriously as a way to conceive of mental and biological phenomena not merely as causally connected, but 
as constitutively linked, without this implying a reduction of psychology to biology” (Di Paolo et al., 2018, p. 184).
3 Small robots can replicate how living beings assemble and create natural structures trough adaptations between them. They can as 
well replicate how bacteria assemble and react to find food.
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ly incompatible. The third choice would include reduction-
ist assumptions. The second choice is complicated, because, 
from one point of view, if the method would be the dialectic 
one, this should not mean the same as taking a reductionist 
stance. Nevertheless, from another point of view, if we choose 
a mechanistic or causal method, reductionism would not be 
automatically excluded.
Why is it that when we criticize reductionism, the vul-
nerability is to fall on the opposite side and forget the con-
tinuity of nature and life? I would say that this happens be-
cause inanimate things are explained mainly by mechanistic 
and causal laws, and mathematical reasoning, and very often 
scientists and philosophers abdicate to affirm the possibility 
of explaining the continuity of matter, nature and life precise-
ly to avoid using the same laws of physics to social and cul-
tural behaviours. If we take the opposite direction and start 
reasoning by social and cultural events, and est ablish for that 
a sp ecific method, that does not fit in physical or chemical 
investigations, the seemingly only way out is to affirm the gap 
between matter, nature and life, particularly human life.
4. The Nature-life Continuity
My main uneasiness when I criticize reductionism of 
any kind myself is to dialectically fall on the opposite side, 
which would be to forget the continuity of nature and life. 
Forgetting this continuity would sometimes mean thinking of 
the human being as an extraordinary being. Perhaps in order 
for human dignity to be taken seriously, we need to emphasize 
the value, relevance, and beauty of human existence. I admit 
it. Sometimes we do this also when we shield the lives and 
rights of other animals. However, ethically valuing and aes-
thetically admiring human beings or other living beings is not 
the same as scientifically explaining, through laws or regular-
ities, or causal norms, the emergence of patterns, living pat-
terns, or social patterns. Moreover, to emphasize the emer-
gence of new patterns, new variations in genes, behaviours, 
and social interact ions should not lead us, as Ruth Millikan 
alerts (1984), to consider that we are biological effects of a 
natural leap, which has taken us to a different level of life. To 
claim that we are kinetic sensitive beings, emotional think-
ing bodies, act ing according to functions and norms, does not 
mean that we transcend nature.
We will probably never know everything there is to 
know about nature or human nature. Furthermore, the way 
we express knowledge is not a mirror of nature. That is for 
sure. However, all this does not mean that the way we express 
our knowledge is not the right way to know about human be-
ings. Many theories can shed some light on different asp ects 
of nature, life and human life. Perhaps explaining the different 
levels of nature does not mean strictly reducing, in the sense 
of explaining away, one level by another.
Nevertheless, maybe to interpret a level by another 
means using different lenses in different layers of the same 
world. Explaining, for example, the emergence of social be-
haviours and patterns through a more fundamental level of 
molecular or atomic interact ions wouldn’t ever allow us to 
explain away our description of the behavioural level. Main-
ly because, as human beings, probably we won’t ever be able 
to see all the layers or explain them all at the same time. 
Should we, therefore, choose a different dialectic method to 
explain living behaviour? I would say that this is an option 
among others. From my point of view, mechanistic, causal 
and dialectic explanations should complement each other, 
not exclude each other.
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